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CHAPTER 17
For EU COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY, Irini Stamatoudi and Paul Torremans,
eds., (2d ed. Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2020)
[17 April 2020; revised 11 June 2020]
A United States Perspective on Digital Single Market Directive art. 17
Jane C. Ginsburg*
Abstract
To a US appraiser, article 17 of the Digital Single Market Directive
suggests the EU has learned from American mistakes (and from its own) in
the allocation of internet intermediaries’ liability for hosting and
communicating user-posted content. Before the DSM Directive, art. 14 of
the 2000 eCommerce Directive set out a notice-and-takedown system very
similar to the regime provided in 17 U.S.C. section 512(c). Both regimes
replaced the normal copyright default, which requires authorization to
exploit works, with a limitation on the liability of service providers who
complied with statutory prerequisites. Because the limitation ensured that
service providers would not be liable in damages, both regimes effectively
codified “Seek forgiveness, not permission.”
Part I of this Chapter will outline the text and judicial interpretation of the
US Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act’s (OCILLA)
notice and takedown provisions in order to explain the regime that one
might view DSM Directive art. 17 as correcting. Part II will analyze the
subsections of art. 17 in order to explain how art. 17 works, including how
it changes the prior EU legal regime, and what it leaves untouched. Part III
will compare art. 17 with US law in order to consider what the US might
learn from the EU.

Introduction

*

Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia Law School. Many
thanks for fruitful discussions to Prof. Matthias Leistner, and for research assistance to Andrew Elliott,
Columbia Law School class of 2020. Portions of this Chapter are based on Copyright Law in Foreign
Jurisdictions: How are other countries handling digital piracy?, Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Prop. of the S. Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. (2020) (testimony of Prof. Jane C. Ginsburg, March 10,
2020) (publication forthcoming).
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To a US appraiser, article 17 of the Digital Single Market Directive suggests
the EU has learned from American mistakes (and from its own) in the allocation of
internet intermediaries’ liability for hosting and communicating user-posted content.
Before the DSM Directive, art. 14 of the 2000 eCommerce Directive1 set out a noticeand-takedown system very similar to the regime provided in 17 U.S.C. section 512(c).
Both regimes replaced the normal copyright default, which requires authorization to
exploit works, with a limitation on the liability of service providers who complied
with statutory prerequisites. Because the limitation ensured that service providers
would not be liable in damages, both regimes effectively codified “Seek forgiveness,
not permission.”
In both the US and the EU, host service providers incurred no obligation to
clear rights in copyrighted content posted by users who were not the authors of that
content, nor did they have any “general obligation . . . to monitor the information that
they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances
indicating illegal activity.”2 Nor did the law in either the US or the EU require host
service providers initially to block unauthorized content from being posted to their
sites. Content would go up, and the burden of finding infringements and notifying the
host service providers fell on authors and copyright owners. Once notified, it sufficed
for the service to respond “expeditiously” to the notice by blocking access to or
removing the infringing content.3 This regime enabled the host provider to derive
economic benefits from the availability of the infringing works on the service during
the time lag between the initial posting of infringing content and notification and
removal. And because other users could repost content when another’s posting was
blocked, these time lags kept the works available for extended periods.4 This situation
gave rise to what the EU Commission referred to as the “value gap,”5 in which the
1

Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market
(Directive on electronic commerce) (OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1).
2
Compare eCommerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC), art. 15 (no general duty to monitor), with
17 USC sec 512(m)(1) (no duty to monitor, nor to “affirmatively seek . . . facts indicating infringing
activity”).
3
Compare eCommerce Directive art. 14 (notice and take down), with 17 USC sec 512(c) (notice and
take down).
4
The CJEU ultimately endorsed a takedown/staydown remedy, which would require some proactive
monitoring by the host service provider; such monitoring would not violate the art. 15(1) prohibition
on imposing a “general duty to monitor”; see, Case C 18/18, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook
Ireland Limited, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 (3 October, 2019) (defamation), para 53: “Article 15(1), must
be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a court of a Member State from:
–
ordering a host provider to remove information which it stores, the content of which is identical
to the content of information, which was previously declared to be unlawful, or to block access to that
information, irrespective of who requested the storage of that information . . .” Moreover, the blocking
order can extend to blocking “access to that information worldwide within the framework of the
relevant international law”, id.
5
See, e.g., European Commission, Questions & Answers: EU negotiators reach a breakthrough to
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services reaped the value of works of authorship without compensating their creators
or rightholders.6
Part I of this Chapter will outline the text and judicial interpretation of the US
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act’s (OCILLA) notice and
takedown provisions in order to explain the regime that one might view DSM
Directive art. 17 as correcting. Part II will analyze the subsections of art. 17 in order
to explain how art. 17 works, including how it changes the prior EU legal regime,
and what it leaves untouched. Part III will compare art. 17 with US law in order to
consider what the US might learn from the EU.
I.

How 17 USC sec. 512(c) works

A.

Overview of Section 512(c)

Section 512(c) sets forth cumulative prerequisites to a hosting service
provider's qualification for exemption from direct or vicarious liability for copyright
infringement.7 The host must "not have actual knowledge that the material or an
modernise copyright rules, 13 February 2019: “How will the new rules tackle the so-called 'value gap'
between
the
creators
and
the
online
platforms?”
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_19_1151 (discussing “value gap” in
connection with an earlier version of the text that became art. 17).
6
See Recital 61:
In recent years, the functioning of the online content market has gained in complexity. Online contentsharing services providing access to a large amount of copyright-protected content uploaded by their
users have become a main source of access to content online. Online services are a means of providing
wider access to cultural and creative works and offer great opportunities for cultural and creative
industries to develop new business models. However, although they enable diversity and ease of
access to content, they also generate challenges when copyright-protected content is uploaded without
prior authorisation from rightholders. Legal uncertainty exists as to whether the providers of such
services engage in copyright-relevant acts, and need to obtain authorisation from rightholders for
content uploaded by their users who do not hold the relevant rights in the uploaded content, without
prejudice to the application of exceptions and limitations provided for in Union law. That uncertainty
affects the ability of rightholders to determine whether, and under which conditions, their works and
other subject matter are used, as well as their ability to obtain appropriate remuneration for such use.
It is therefore important to foster the development of the licensing market between rightholders and
online content-sharing service providers. Those licensing agreements should be fair and keep a
reasonable balance between both parties. Rightholders should receive appropriate remuneration for
the use of their works or other subject matter. However, as contractual freedom should not be affected
by those provisions, rightholders should not be obliged to give an authorisation or to conclude
licensing agreements.
7
In addition, section 512(i)(1)(A) requires all service providers (access providers and search engines,
as well as hosts), to adopt and implement a policy for terminating “repeat infringers”. This requirement
has been construed, regarding access providers, in BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Communs.,
Inc., 881 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018); and regarding host providers in EMI Christian Music Group v.
MP3Tunes, 844 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2016) (both finding the policies to be ineffective) and in in Ventura
Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc., 885 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding the policy to be sufficiently
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activity using the material on the system or network is infringing"; and it must not be
"aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent";
moreover, if the host has the "right and ability to control" the originator's activity, the
host must not "receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity."8 Once the host becomes "aware" of infringing activity, it must act
"expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material."9 Section 512(c)(2)
requires that a service provider, in order to benefit from the reduction in liability,
designate and provide contact information concerning an agent to receive notification
of claimed infringements. The service must also state and reasonably implement a
policy for terminating repeat infringers.10 Copyright owners alleging that the service
provider is hosting infringements must send the provider's agent a signed, written
communication identifying the work infringed, the material alleged to be infringing
and its location; a statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that
the use is unauthorized; and a sworn statement that the information contained in the
notification is believed to be accurate. The service provider incurs no duty to
“monitor […] its service or affirmatively seek […] facts indicating infringing
activity.”11
Upon receiving the notification, the provider must "expeditiously" remove or
block access to the alleged infringing material, or else face the full range of liability
should the author prevail in an infringement suit. But the provider who removes or
blocks the material must also so notify the subscriber; the subscriber may then send
a "counter notification" (whose contents the law prescribes).12 In that event, in order
to maintain its immunity, the service must send the counter notification to the person
who notified the service of the alleged infringement, and must inform that person that
the service will replace the material in ten business days. The copyright owner must
within that time "file […] an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber
from engaging in infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider's
system or network.” If the copyright owner does not initiate the action, and so inform
the service provider's designated agent, then the service provider must put back the
material "not less than 10, nor more than 14, business days following receipt of the
counter notice ...” . 13 The purpose of the put-back requirement is to ensure that § 512
applied, albeit inadequately stated).
8
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(l)(A), (B).
9
Id.§ 512(c)(l)(A)(iii).
10
Id. sec. 512(j).
11
Id. sec. 512(m)(1).
12
See id. § 512(g)(3).
13
In practice, however, the period prescribed for filing an infringement action before the host service
provider reposts the content, has proved problematic for both copyright owners and end users. See
SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 162-63 (May 2020) (citations
omitted) [hereafter REGISTER’S SECTION 512 REPORT] (“This particular statutory timeframe turns out
to present something like a Schrödinger’s timeframe: both too long to have non-infringing speech
down, and too short to enable a copyright owner to adequately research and file a complaint in federal
court.”).
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does not make it too easy for copyright owners to compel the removal of allegedly
infringing material without judicial process. Section 512 initially facilitates that
removal because it encourages providers who have received notice to take down the
material immediately, since the text insulates service providers who comply with the
statutory requirements from suit by persons (including the subscriber) disgruntled at
the removal of the material from the server.14 The put-back provision thus affords an
important counterweight. Moreover, if the copyright owner knowingly
misrepresented that the posted content was infringing, OCILLA provides for
damages, costs and attorneys’ fees to be awarded against the copyright owner.15 The
“put back” and misrepresentation provisions were intended to guard against
copyright owner abuse of the notice and takedown system, for example, to remove
clearly non infringing (but potentially embarrassing) material.16
B.

Technological and economic assumptions underlying OCILLA

Before examining how U.S. courts have interpreted sec. 512(c), it is important
to consider the factual and technological backdrop against which Congress enacted
OCILLA, and compare it to today’s Internet. In a study published in May 2020, the
U.S. Copyright Office observed:
At the time the DMCA was crafted and then enacted, the internet had only
recently evolved beyond the “walled gardens” of AOL and CompuServe,
Yahoo!, Amazon, and eBay were each a few years old, and “social media,”
to the extent it existed was mainly instant messaging services, on-line dating
sites, and Classmates.com. There was no Facebook or YouTube or Twitter;
the first MP3 player had just been launched, and Napster, which popularized
peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing, would not exist until the following year.
Today, the internet is a rich tapestry of social media sites and niche networked
communities, online retail giants and e-commerce side businesses, as well as
an almost endless amount of music and audiovisual entertainment from major
studios and publishers, indie artists, and future stars. Every day countless new
internet services join the mix. And new artists continue to find an audience
without having to first convince a third party that there is a demand for what
they do.17
According to testimony presented by Prof. Mark Schultz to the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, 18
14

See id. § 512(g)(1).
Id. sec. 512(f)
16
For a detailed study of the put back regime, see, e.g., Zoe Carpou, Robots, Pirates, and the Rise of
the Automated Takedown Regime: Using the DMCA to Fight Piracy and Protect End-Users, 39
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 551 (2016).
17
REGISTER’S SECTION 512 REPORT at 28-29.
18
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act at 22: What is it, Why was it Enacted, and Where are We
15
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1998, the year the DMCA
passed
Fewer than 3 million pages.

Online Infringement Today

Most users on home dialup,
and a single song took 10
minutes or more to download.

Users connect from multiple
super-fast mobile, home wi-fi,
and public networks, and a
song takes seconds to
download.
Online infringement occurs
constantly as many users and
systems upload many different
copies of the same work.

Over 6.4 billion pages

Online infringement likely
started with a particular user,
uploading a particular file.

Online copyright infringement
often spread through the
relatively slow, methodical
copying of a particular file
from one computer to another.
If copyright owners caught
and contained an outbreak
quickly enough, they could
stop the spread of the file and
save it from “escaping” into
the broader world.
Service providers were likely
to be more or less indifferent
intermediaries that did not
derive any great value from
infringement.

Files spread quickly and
simultaneously from many
users and sources.

Infringement is a chronic
problem that can be
suppressed, reduced, and
managed, but never fully
contained.
Many popular and lucrative
legal services are built to host
user-posted content and
benefit greatly from the
presence of attractive
infringing material.
Infringement notices in the
billions.

Infringement notices in the
hundreds, at most.

Commented [JG1]: Please ensure that the chart is all on
the same page, or at least on facing pages

At the same Senate Hearing, Prof. Jessica Litman, while expressing
skepticism about copyright owners’ lamentations, agreed that “The principal
weakness of the statutory notice-and-takedown system was that it didn't easily scale
to the size of the 21st century internet. When Congress was debating the appropriate
Now Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 5 (2020)
(statement of Mark Schultz, Chair, IP & Tech. Law Ctr., Univ. of Akron Sch. of Law).
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contours of section 512's notice-and-takedown provisions, the model everyone
appears to have had in mind was a human-mediated one.”19
OCILLA’s shortcomings (at least in retrospect) extend beyond its failure to
anticipate the tremendous volume of infringing content, much of it disseminated
through a means – file-sharing – that fell completely outside the notice and takedown
system.20 Congress’ allocation to copyright owners of the burdens of identifying
infringing postings, rather than requiring service providers to clear rights in the
posted works, has also proved problematic. This attribution of responsibility may
have made sense given the premise that the service providers would be passive actors
hosting third party websites whose operators posted infringing content,21 rather than
the service providers themselves operating websites that enhanced access to and
monetized those postings, as is now the case. Given that premise, and the concomitant
anticipated limited economic dependence of the service on the posted content,22
Congress acceded to service provider insistence that monitoring at the point of upload

19

Id. at 8 (statement of Jessica Litman, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Mich.).
Jay Dratler & Stephen McJohn, Cyberlaw: Intellectual Property in the Millennium, § 6.03 (2018);
Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 695, 716
(2011); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers for
Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 15, 37 (2006) (describing a file-sharing network
as a "mere conduit," which would fall under 512(a) and therefore not require compliance with a noticeand-takedown regime).
21
S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 43 (1998) (describing § 512(c) safe harbor and noting "[e]xamples of such
storage include providing server space for a user's web site, for a chatroom, or other forum in which
material may be posted at the direction of users."); H.R. Rep. No. 105–551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998) (same
language). See also Senator Orrin Hatch's opening remarks at a 1997 hearing on online service
provider liability in the lead up to drafting the OCILLA, wherein he framed in part the needs of online
service providers by saying that without legislative intervention, "it might be said that a service
provider would be held liable for the unauthorized posting of copyrighted photographs on a Web site
or electronic bulletin board residing on the service provider's network, regardless of whether the
service provider knew of the posting or exercised any sort of control over the content of the site." The
Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and Internet Service Providers: Hearing Before S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (Sept. 4, 1997).
22
See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. V. Netcom On-Line Comm. Svcs., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (finding “no evidence that infringement . . . in any way enhances the value of Netcom’s services
to subscribers or attracts new subscribers,”); The Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and
Internet Service Providers: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 87 (Sept. 4, 1997)
(Testimony of George Vradenburg, general counsel of AOL, disclaiming economic dependence of
isps on infringing content. But see INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group
on Intellectual Property Rights 117–18 (1995): The on-line services provide subscribers with the
capability of uploading works because it attracts subscribers and increases usage -- for which they are
paid. Service providers reap rewards for infringing activity. It is difficult to argue that they should not
bear the responsibilities.”.
20
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would be infeasible.23 In the ensuing years, by contrast, automatic ex ante filtering
has become increasingly realistic and available.24
C.

Judicial interpretation

Section 512(c) has spawned an abundant caselaw construing most of its
provisions.25 The decisions of greatest relevance to DSM Directive art. 17 concern
23

See, e.g., Cassandra Imfeld & Victoria Smith Ekstrand, The Music Industry and the Legislative
Development of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's Online Service Provider Provision, 10 Comm.
L. & Pol'y 291, 305 (2005), (quoting testimony at a hearing in February 1996 related to the NII
Copyright Protection Act by CompuServe General Counsel Steven Heaton that ISPs “simply cannot
review and monitor all the data that is transmitted over and stored in their networks or bulletin boards.
. . . Providers of online services do not know what is being uploaded onto, transmitted through, stored
upon, and downloaded from their systems.”).
24
See, e.g., Aaron Weiss, Content Filters: Will ISPs Become the Enforcers of the Web?, 12 netWorker
no. 1, p. 24 (2008). Indeed, even in 2001, the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the appropriateness of the
district court’s imposition of a filtering obligation while nevertheless remanding the injunction to
modify its scope, observed: "Conversely, Napster may be vicariously liable when it fails to
affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access to potentially infringing files listed
in its search index. Napster has both the ability to use its search function to identify infringing musical
recordings and the right to bar participation of users who engage in the transmission of infringing
files." A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
25
“Service Provider”: Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding
online auction site eBay qualifies), CoStar Grp. V. LoopNet Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2004)
(applying the safe harbor to a website that allowed real estate brokers to post listings); contra, Agence
Fr. Presse v. Morel, 934 F.Supp. 2d 547, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding a photo licensing website that
"directly licens[ed] copyrighted material online" did not "'do something useful' with respect to
providing or facilitating access to materials online or the activities of internet users," and as such was
not a service provider).
Courts have found many functions qualify as “storage at the direction of a user”. UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that 512(c)
protection extends to “access-facilitating processes that automatically occur,” including transcoding
content and making it available for other users to watch); Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d
19, 39 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting earlier Shelter Capital decision, noting that protections extend beyond
“mere electronic storage lockers,” and finding YouTube's transcoding, playback, and "related videos"
functions, albeit not strictly “storage,” qualify for safe harbor protection).
The "actual knowledge," 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i), and red-flag knowledge ("facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent”), 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), standards are subject to
highly controversial interpretations. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012)
(finding both provisions refer to knowledge of specific infringements, but actual knowledge refers to
subjective awareness while red-flag knowledge refers to whether a defendant "was subjectively aware
of facts that would have made the specific infringement 'objectively' obvious); Capitol Records, LLC
v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 93–97 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that red-flag knowledge refers to what
would be obvious by "ordinary person" and that a service provider employee viewing and interacting
with an infringing video is not sufficient to establish red-flag knowledge absent additional evidence
that the employee knew facts sufficient to conclude the video was likely infringing); EMI Christian
Music Grp. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 92–94 (2d Cir. 2016) (reversing a directed verdict and
finding red-flag knowledge could be established where a service provider was aware that all songs of
certain categories–those streamed before 2007 and those recorded by the Beatles–were infringing, and
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judicial interpretation of the level of knowledge that will disqualify a service provider
from claiming the safe harbor. The statute provides that the service provider must not
“have actual knowledge that the material . . . on the system or network is infringing,”
or “in the absence of such knowledge” must not be “aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent.”26 Courts have interpreted the latter, so-

thus 512(c) could impose a "time-limited, targeted duty" to actively remove these songs from the
platform to enjoy safe harbor protection); Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d
1045, 1057–58 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding a service provider employee, or agent, might have knowledge,
and reiterating red-flag knowledge requires infringement "be immediately apparent to a non-expert").
“Acts Expeditiously”: Long v. Dorset, 369 F.Supp.3d 939 (N.D.Cal. 2019) (reviewing cases and
determining that five business days to remove pornographic photos uploaded to Facebook subscriber’s
hacked webpage met requirement of expeditious removal when Facebook communicated daily with
subscriber); Rosen v. Global Net Access, LLC, CV 10-2721-DMG, 2014 WL 2803752 at *5 (C.D. Cal.
2014) (finding a service provider did not act expeditiously when it took two months to remove
content); Io Grp. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1150 (N.D.Cal. 2008) (finding that
removing content "on the same day the notice is received (or within a few days thereafter)" constitutes
expeditious removal); Square Ring, Inc. v. Doe-1, No. 09-563, 2015 WL 307840, at *7 (D. Del. Jan.
23, 2015) (declining to find two days was expeditious as a matter of law where the content at issue
was a live broadcast and the service provider had been notified before the broadcast of likely
infringement).
“Financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity”: Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488
F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007) (common law standards and § 512(c)(1)(B) standards are the same);
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022–1023 (9th Cir. 2001); Costar Group Inc. v.
Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D. Md. 2001), aff’d 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004) (‘Basically,
the DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious infringement because it codifies both elements of
vicarious liability.’).
“Right and ability to control”: Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1093–94 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (finding control must mean more than "the ability of a service provider to remove or block
access to materials posted on its website or stored in its system.”); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding no ability to control absent "evidence of
inducement" or evidence "the defendant exerted substantial influence of its users' activities”); Viacom
Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 38 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring “something more” than the ability
to restrict access and remove content but remanding the issue for further consideration).
“Designated Agent: BWP Media USA Inc. v. Hollywood Fan Sites LLC, 115 F.Supp.3d 397, 402–03
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding designated agents must be identified on both the provider's website and
registered at the Copyright Office, and that a subsidiary service provider cannot rely on a designation
by a parent company); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CV 05-4753, 2009 WL 1334364, at
*8 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2009) (noting certain allowable, "inconsequential" departures from listed
requirements in posting designated agent information).
Adequate Notice: Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1091 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting
notices must be in writing, while only "substantial compliance" is required for the other statutory
notice elements); ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding the notification requirements "are written to as to reduce the burden of holders of multiple
copyrights who face extensive infringement of their works”); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d
1101, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding inadequate notices cannot impute knowledge to service providers
of infringement); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 993 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(finding that links to a search results page may not sufficiently identify infringing material).
26
17 U.S.C. sec. 512(c)(1)(A)(i)(ii).

9
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called “red flag,” standard to impose a “high bar.”27 Notably, “general knowledge
that infringement is ‘ubiquitous’ does not impose a duty on the service provider to
monitor or search its service for infringements.”28 Even a showing that the host was
not only “generally aware of, but welcomed, copyright-infringing material being
placed on their website,” does not suffice to overcome its immunity without a further
demonstration “as to whether [the host] actually knew, or was aware of facts or
circumstances that would indicate, the existence of particular instances of
infringement.”29 The requirement that specific infringements be “obvious”30 before
the “red flag” will wave, has allowed hosts to remain profitably ignorant of the
content of their users’ postings.
That said, courts have acknowledged limits to the extent of service provider
passive aggression that section 512(c) permits. While the host may remain blissfully
unaware of particular infringements, it may not be “willfully blind” to them. 31 A
service provider will be willfully blind if it “made a ‘deliberate effort to avoid guilty
knowledge.’”32 But even if a particular posting might raise some suspicions, the host
is not “willfully blind” if it fails to investigate, because another provision of section
512 exonerates hosts from “affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing
activity.”33 According to the Second Circuit, requiring investigation short of an
“obvious” infringement would undermine the balance Congress struck in section 512
reflecting a policy that would foster the development of service providers:
[W]e can see no reason to construe the statute as vitiating the protection of §
512(m) and requiring investigation merely because the service provider learns
facts raising a suspicion of infringement (as opposed to facts making
27

See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (C.D. Cal.
2009), quoted in, Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2017).
28
Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d 676 F.3d 19,
31, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming that general awareness of possible infringement does not impose a
duty to monitor, and that red-flag knowledge refers to awareness of specific instances of infringement).
29
Viacom Int’l Inc., 676 F.3d at 33 (2d Cir. 2012).
30
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2016); Viacom Int’l Inc., 676 F.3d at
31 (“the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would
have made the specific infringement “objectively” obvious to a reasonable person.”). The courts have
equated the statutory term “apparent” with “obvious”: it is not obvious that the two are synonymous.
31
Viacom Int’l Inc., 676 F.3d at 35. On remand, however, the district court did not find facts
establishing that YouTube was blind to “specific and identifiable instances of infringement.” Viacom
International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F.Supp.2d 110, 116–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
32
Viacom Int’l Inc., 676 F.3d at 35 quoting In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003). Instances
in which courts have found “willful blindness” in section 512(c) cases seem to be exceedingly rare,
however. See EMI Christian Music Grp. v. MP3Tunes, 844 F.3d 79, 92–94 (2d Cir. 2016) (restoring
a jury verdict that found red-flag knowledge and willful blindness where an online storage locker
website allowed users to copy and store files of recordings which the website operator knew had not
been authorized for digital release); 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.04[A][1][b][vi] (no cases other
than EMI Christian Music have successfully shown willful blindness; Viacom “essentially empties
any significance from the willful blindness inquiry.”).
33
17 USC sec. 512(m)(1).
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infringement obvious). Protecting service providers from the expense of
monitoring was an important part of the compromise embodied in the safe
harbor. Congress’s objective was to serve the public interest by encouraging
Internet service providers to make expensive investments in the expansion of
the speed and capacity of the Internet by relieving them of burdensome
expenses and liabilities to copyright owners, while granting to the latter
compensating protections in the service providers’ takedown obligations. If
service providers were compelled constantly to take stock of all information
their employees may have acquired that might suggest the presence of
infringements in user postings, and to undertake monitoring investigations
whenever some level of suspicion was surpassed, these obligations would
largely undo the value of § 512(m).34
As a result of an absolutist interpretation of § 512(m), courts have released service
providers from any duty to investigate, and thus have effectively collapsed the actual
and red flag knowledge standards.35
By contrast, while the statutory dispensation from a duty to monitor may limit
the scope of a “willful blindness” challenge to the safe harbor, a host who “induces”
users to post infringing content is not likely to qualify for the safe harbor.36 Indeed,
where the host assists users in uploading files, it is likely to have actual or red flag
knowledge of the files’ infringing content.37
Recent decisions suggest ways in which a right owner might satisfy even an
exigent interpretation of the “red flag” standard. Even though “[t]he infringement
must be immediately apparent to a non-expert,”38 the work itself may supply evidence
that its uploading was unauthorized. For example, in Mavrix Photographs, LLC v.
LiveJournal, Inc., “[s]ome of the [plaintiff’s] photographs at issue . . . contained
either a generic watermark or a watermark containing Mavrix’s website,
‘Mavrixonline.com.’” The watermark could have alerted the host that the work,
authorized for one site, was not available for posting to another. Similarly, in EMI
Christian Music Group v. MP3Tunes,39 the court observed that the host knew that at
the time of the infringing files’ upload, the musical recordings at issue had not been
licensed for dissemination in MP3 format. Accordingly, “the jury reasonably could
34

Capitol Records, Inc. v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d at 98–99.
REGISTER’S SECTION 512 REPORT, supra note 13 at 123 (noting that at a stakeholder roundtable
hosted by the Copyright Office, participants were unable to articulate a scenario that would qualify as
red flag knowledge but not also as actual knowledge under existing judicial interpretations).
36
See, e.g., EMI Christian Music Group v. MP3Tunes, 844 F.3d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 2016); Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining, however, to rule
that sec. 512 categorically excludes inducers from the safe harbor).
37
Id.
38
Mavrix, 873 F.3d at 1058, quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d
1099, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2009) and citing H.R. Rep. 105–551, pt. 2 at 58 (1998) “(explaining that
infringements must be ‘apparent from even a brief and casual viewing’).”
39
844 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2016).
35
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have concluded that MP3tunes and Robertson were aware of ‘facts and circumstances
that make infringement obvious.’”40 EMI Christian is particularly significant for its
embrace of a takedown/stay down remedy. The court distinguished prior decisions
which had ruled ex ante blocking remedies incompatible with the services’ absence
of a duty to monitor their sites. Proof of the host’s red flag knowledge justified an
obligation to block content of whose infringing character the host was already
aware.41
Even accounting for a possible cautious evolution towards remedies imposing
some pro-active obligations on host service providers, this caselaw illustrates the
difficulties arising from a regime in which the default has shifted from requiring
rights clearance before exploiting a work, to absolving the exploiting UGC platform
or website from infringement liability unless the rightholder can demonstrate that the
exploiter should objectively have known precisely which works it was hosting, and
where they could be found on the service. The resulting allocation of benefits and
burdens has tipped so far from the equilibrium envisioned in 1998, that the telecoms
and infant entrepreneurs whose Internet ventures Congress sought to encourage have
become market forces often more dominant than the copyright industries Congress
once feared would stifle the new entrants.42 As the Register of Copyrights has
recently concluded: “Based upon its own analysis of the present effectiveness of
section 512, the [Copyright] Office has concluded that Congress’ original intended
balance has been tilted askew.”43
If Congress may have over-achieved its objective of fostering the
development of host service providers, its provisions for ensuring that users could
continue to post non-infringing content may have fallen short of the mark. It is
40

Id at 92.
Id at 93: “the jury was clearly instructed, and we presume it understood, that MP3tunes had no
continuing, affirmative duty to monitor its servers for infringement. The jury could comply with that
instruction and still find that MP3tunes was required to disable access to pre-2007 songs by “act[ing]
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to” the pre-2007 songs . . . The jury was therefore permitted
to conclude that a time-limited, targeted duty—even if encompassing a large number of songs—does
not give rise to an “amorphous” duty to monitor in contravention of the DMCA. Viacom, 676 F.3d at
31; see also id. at 34 (suggesting that a reasonable jury could find red-flag knowledge with respect to
groups of clips). The same is true of the Beatles songs. The jury heard evidence that Robertson knew
there had been no legal online distribution of Beatles tracks before 2010, other than one track used
within a video game. Robertson further admitted that he authored a 2009 e-mail that showed he was
aware of the plaintiffs’ position that “[the] Beatles have never authorized their songs to be available
digitally.”
42
See, e.g., Forbes’ “Global 2000” list, documenting the largest companies in the world in 2019, for
instance, where the top 100 companies include (among others) the following American corporations:
Alphabet [Google] (#17), Amazon (#28), Facebook (#63). The largest “copyright industry,” Disney,
ranks #70. The World's Largest Public Companies, 2019 Ranking, FORBES, accessible at:
https://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#country:United%20States (last visited April 13, 2020).
43
REGISTER’S SECTION 512 REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. See also id. at 197: “The Copyright Office
concludes that the balance Congress intended when it established the section 512 safe harbor system
is askew.”
41
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unclear whether section 512’s counter-notice and put-back mechanism has succeeded
in maintaining online availability of non-infringing postings. The immense volume
of allegedly infringing postings has led to a concomitant volume of “robo-notices”44
(typically from copyright owners who can afford the costs of identifying
infringements and sending mass takedown notices).45 These notices may sweep in
postings that would be non-infringing fair uses. The apparently low proportion of
ensuing counter-notifications46 could mean that many fair uses are being suppressed,
or it could simply mean that the vast majority of postings are in fact infringing. Even
if the number of takedowns flowing from false positives is not as great as some
proclaim,47 it may well be possible that fear or ignorance will cause some fair users
to decline to contest a takedown notice.48
A further impediment to preventing the removal of lawful postings may result
from judicial interpretation of the statutory disincentives to abuse the notice and
takedown system. Section 512(f) provides for damages and attorneys’ fees against
the rightholder’s “knowing material misrepresentation” that the posted content was
infringing. Courts’ application of that standard has proven very forgiving. 49 The
44

Joe Karaganis & Jennifer Urban, The Rise of the Robo Notice, 58 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM
28 (2015).
45
Section 512 of Title 17, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet
of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Congress at 16 (2014) (testimony of Prof. Annemarie Bridy
noting copyright owners who "can't afford automated systems" may have to rely on websites with prepackaged forms to readily send takedown requests); Motion Picture Association of America, Comment
on Section 512 Study Before the U.S. Copyright Office, 80 Fed. Reg. 81,862, at 16 (April 1, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-90285 (noting that “smaller entities
may not be able to afford to use technology to enable discovery of infringing content”).
46
Though data is limited, one study analyzing the notice and takedown regime interviewed 29
intermediary online service providers of various sizes as well as six "major notice senders"
(rightsholders and enforcement agents) and found that one only respondent "reported receiving more
than a handful [of counter-notices] a year" and that many reported no counter-notices, despite
processing thousands of takedown requests. Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield,
Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, U.C. BERKELEY PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER
SERIES, 44 (2017). Another study analyzed more than 540,000 notices to Google and Twitter between
2001 and 2012. It estimated that of notices analyzed in 2011, only 0.131 percent were counter-notices,
and in 2012 the number was 0.02 percent. It found no counter-notices for the years 2008 through 2010.
Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of the State of DMCA
Takedown Notices, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 369, 426, 462 (2014). But see REGISTER’S SECTION 512
REPORT, supra note 13 at 147 n. 788 (raising questions about the Urban et al. study’s methodology).
47
See, e.g., Urban, Karaganis & Schofield, supra note 46 at 88, arguing that 31 percent of takedown
requests in a survey sample were "potentially problematic." However, the authors said only 4.2 percent
were "fundamentally flawed” (for instance, by identifying an incorrect work), while 19.5 percent were
due to concerns about meeting the notification requirements (including everything from missing
signatures to links the authors thought might be insufficiently specific to allow the service provider to
identify the particular infringing work at issue), and another 6.6 percent presented what the authors
felt were fair use questions.
48
See Urban, Karaganis & Schofield, supra note 46 at 44-45.
49
On the other hand, the most egregious reported case did result in the award of damages and
attorneys’ fees, see Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F.Supp.2d 1195 (N.D.Cal.2004), in which
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Ninth Circuit has held that “a copyright holder need only form a subjective good faith
belief that a use is not authorized.”50 A kind of symmetry has resulted: just as an
infringement must be objectively “obvious” to meet the red flag knowledge standard
and thus deprive the host of its statutory immunity, so, to engage the rightholder’s
liability for knowing misrepresentation, must the lawful nature of the posting be so
patent that the rightholder could not subjectively believe that the content infringed.
That, too, sets a “high bar” likely to screen out many misrepresentation claims.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit also ruled that a rightholder cannot form
a good faith belief in the unlawfulness of the posted content without first endeavoring
to ascertain whether the posting could be fair use or otherwise authorized by law.
Thus, the indiscriminate sending of takedown notices would contravene the court’s
“unequivocal holding that [the rightholder] must consider fair use before sending a
takedown notification;” failure to “consider” lawful uses would render the
rightholder “liable for damages under § 512(f).”51 In light of the immense quantity
of uploaded content for which a rightholder’s “bot” might find a match, one may
wonder how a rightholder could in practice undertake the consideration requisite to a
“procedurally ‘informed’ subjective good faith belief on fair use before sending a
takedown notice.”52 It is unclear whether every posting will require human review, 53
or if algorithms could meet the task of identifying probable fair uses,54 thus
circumscribing the universe of postings for which the rightholder’s human agents
must form a subjective belief in the posting’s unlawfulness.
II.

How DSM Directive art. 17 Works

the court found that the copyright owner met the statutory standard because the disclosure of internal
company emails for whistle-blowing purposes was clearly fair use, and that the copyright holder was
using the notice and takedown regime “as a sword to suppress publication of embarrassing content
rather than as a shield to protect its intellectual property.”
50
See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016); Rossi v. Motion
Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.2004); Stern v. Lavender, 319 F.Supp.3d 650, 683
(S.D.N.Y. 2018); Johnson v. New Destiny Christian Ctr. Church, Inc., 6:17-cv-710-Orl-37DCI, 2019
WL 1014245 at *4–5 (M.D. Fl. March 4, 2019), appeal pending.
51
Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1154.
52
See Matthias Leistner, European Copyright Licensing and Infringement Liability Under Art. 17
DSM Directive Compared to Secondary Liability of Content Platforms in the U.S. – Can We Make
the New European System a Global Opportunity Instead of a Local Challenge?, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
GEISTIGES E IGENTUM/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL (forthcoming 2020) (including suggestions
for overcoming the potentially prohibitive transactions costs).
53
See, e.g. Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 499, 532–33 (2017) (finding an “obvious implication” in Lenz to require human review,
but suggesting that algorithm-based reviews might still be permissible); REGISTER’S SECTION 512
REPORT, supra note 13, at 150-52 (discussing uncertainty regarding need for human review or
permissibility of automated search programs to form a good faith belief that posted content is not fair
use).
54
See, e.g., Maayan Perel and Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright
Enforcement, 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 473, 487–88 (2016).
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Article 17 adopts a completely different approach from the US in section 512.
We have seen how the text and judicial interpretation of sec. 512 have enabled hosts
to develop into massively profitable businesses based in substantial part on their
provision of access to copyrighted works. Solicitude for new digital communications
intermediaries through statutory immunity, together with technologically-overtaken
expectations for effective semi-private copyright enforcement through notices and
takedowns, combined to produce a system in which hosts’ statutorily-authorized
passivity allowed them to reap the benefits of communicating copyrighted works,
while copyright owners have struggled to prevent uncontrolled dissemination of their
works. Private ordering, through preclearance systems such as Content-ID, has
developed alongside the statutory regime, to enable clearance and monetization,55 but
content owners complain that the statutory backdrop diminishes their bargaining
power.56 Worse, for individual authors and small copyright owners, Content-ID does
not accommodate small repertories,57 thus leaving them only options to block, but
not to derive revenue from hosts’ dissemination of their works.58 In light of the
shortcomings of the US law, does the DSM Directive strike a better balance?
A. Basic structure
55

See, e.g., Bruce Boyden, The Failure of the DMCA Notice and Takedown System, 3–4 (CPIP 2013)
(observing that copyright owners and online services have developed work-arounds to the notice-andtakedown system via “technological tools that allow copyright owners to identify their content and
specify what should happen when it appears on the service provider’s system,” calling such “private
ordering” a step in the right direction but a sign of the need “for a retooling of the notice and takedown
regime.”); REGISTER’S SECTION 512 REPORT, supra note 13 at 42-44 (describing Content-ID, and
summarizing critiques0; id. at 45-46 (describing other filtering technologies).
56
See, e.g. Warner Music Group, Comment on Section 512 Study Before the U.S. Copyright Office,
80 Fed. Reg. 81,862 (April 7, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-001386022; "Fixing the Value Gap: Now on the Legislative Agenda" in Global Music Report: State of the
Industry Overview, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY 22 (2016); T.
Randolph Beard et al., Safe Harbors and the Evolution of Music Retailing, Phoenix Center Policy
Bulletin No. 41 (March 2017); Peter Kafka, Here's Why the Music Labels are Furious at YouTube.
Again, RECODE (April 11, 2016).
57
Using Content ID, YouTube Help, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3244015?hl=en (last
visited April 8, 2020) (“To be approved, you must own exclusive rights to a substantial body of
original material that is frequently uploaded by the YouTube user community.”); REGISTER’S SECTION
512 REPORT, supra note 13 at 43 (“Participation in the Content ID program is limited to rightsholders
who ‘own exclusive rights to a substantial body of original material that is frequently uploaded by the
YouTube creator community.’ Some commenters complain that this policy unfairly excludes smaller
copyright owners; in their view, ‘every artist should be entitled to this service, to register their music
once and for all.’”).
58
Copyright
Management
Tools,
YouTube
Help,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9245819 (last visited April 8, 2020) (describing
YouTube’s general takedown notices, its Copyright Match Tool, and its Content Verification Program
as alternatives to Content ID, though these alternatives only allow users to request the content be taken
down or else request to contact the uploader—there is no provision similar to Content ID’s
monetization option).
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The Directive, art. 17(4), requires Online Content Sharing Service Providers
[hereafter OCSSP] (a defined term, discussed below) to obtain authorization for
users’ posting of content. The authorization granted to the service provider will also
cover its users, “when they are not acting on a commercial basis or where their
activity does not generate significant revenues.”59 As a result, the host’s license
would not automatically shield users who earn revenue, from sponsorship or
advertisement, from posted content, but hosts and copyright owners might negotiate
to share that revenue, thus extending the license’s coverage. By contrast, the sec. 512
safe harbor applies only to the host service provider; even users whose postings are
unaccompanied by advertisements remain vulnerable to copyright infringement suits
and liable for damages in the event infringement is found (although non-commercial
users seem unlikely to target for suits seeking monetary relief).
If the copyright owner is not willing to license, or not willing to license until
some period after the initial disclosure of the content on the copyright owner’s own
site, then the OCSSP must make best efforts to block unlicensed content from
appearing on the service, whether forever, or during the rightowner’s period of
exclusivity. Rightholders and OCSSPs will need to cooperate to identify the content
to be blocked. If rightholders fail to provide OCSSPs with the information necessary
to implement proactive filtering, the service provider will not be liable for the
unidentified content’s appearance on its site.60
Finally, for content neither licensed nor pre-blocked, the OCSSP is required,
“upon receiving sufficiently substantiated notice from the rightholders, to disable
access to, or to remove from, their websites the notified works or other subject matter,
and ma[k]e best efforts to prevent their future uploads . . .”61 In other words, art. 17(4)
establishes for most OCSSPs, a tripartite regime: license, block, or takedown/stay
down.
The Directive’s absence of specification as to how the OCSSPs are to obtain
permission may prompt two related concerns. First, rights clearance for all works
posted to OCSSPs (essentially, large platforms) may entail excessive transactions
costs. Second, to reduce those costs, OCSSPs might negotiate only with large
59

See DSM Directive, art. 17(2).
See Recital 66: “Where rightholders do not provide online content-sharing service providers with
the relevant and necessary information on their specific works or other subject matter, or where no
notification concerning the disabling of access to, or the removal of, specific unauthorised works or
other subject matter has been provided by rightholders, and, as a result, those service providers cannot
make their best efforts to avoid the availability of unauthorised content on their services, in accordance
with high industry standards of professional diligence, such service providers should not be liable for
unauthorised acts of communication to the public or of making available to the public of such
unidentified works or other subject matter.”
61
Art. 17(4).
60
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copyright owners and collectives, leaving individual authors and small rightholders
to bear the burden of notifying the OCSSPs of infringing content. But the Directive
provides mechanisms to address these potential difficulties. Art. 17(10) mandates
“stakeholder dialogues” “to discuss best practices for cooperation between online
content-sharing service providers and rightholders” and to “issue guidance on the
application of this Article, in particular regarding the cooperation referred to in
paragraph 4.” Similarly, art. 17(8) mandates both cooperation and transparency by
OCSSPs toward all rightholders: “Member States shall provide that online contentsharing service providers provide rightholders, at their request, with adequate
information on the functioning of their practices with regard to the cooperation
referred to in paragraph 4 and, where licensing agreements are concluded between
service providers and rightholders, information on the use of content covered by the
agreements.” As a result, while there will be many details to resolve, it appears that
the Directive strives to ensure that individual authors and small rightholders will be
able to negotiate permissions62 and to obtain ex ante blocking of works they are
unwilling to license for “sharing” on online platforms.
Where art. 17 applies, it replaces the 512-like notice-and-takedown system
established in art. 14(1) of the 2000 eCommerce Directive.63 That regime remains in
force for service providers who are not OCSSPs.
B. Who is an OCSSP?
Unlike the online actors to whom 17 USC sec. 512(c) (host service providers)
and (d) (search engines) broadly apply, DSM Directive art. 17 covers only a narrow
class of service providers, focused essentially on large platforms, such as YouTube
and Facebook. DSM Directive art. 2(6) defines an OCSSP as:
[A] provider of an information society service of which the main or one of
the main purposes is to store and give the public access to a large amount of
copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by its
users, which it organises and promotes for profit-making purposes.
Art. 2(6) explicitly excludes:
Providers of services, such as not-for-profit online encyclopedias, not-forprofit educational and scientific repositories, open source softwaredeveloping and -sharing platforms, electronic communication service
providers as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972, online marketplaces,
62

Collective Management Organizations, more prevalent in the EU than in the US, may grant blanket
licenses covering a broader range of works than US CMOs represent, and thus significantly ameliorate
the problem of high transactions costs in the EU.
63
See art. 17(3).

17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3579076

business-to-business cloud services and cloud services that allow users to
upload content for their own use.
Thus, it is clear that services such as Wikipedia, Dropbox and eBay fall
outside the scope of art. 17, as would all not-for-profit educational sites. As recital 62
specifies: “Such services should not include services that have a main purpose other
than that of enabling users to upload and share a large amount of copyright-protected
content with the purpose of obtaining profit from that activity.” Equally importantly,
given the definition and the recital, search engines would not be considered OCSSPs.
Search engines may act for profit, but their main purpose is to locate content (whether
or not user-posted), not to enable users to post that content, nor primarily to facilitate
their sharing of it.64
In addition, art. 17’s duties do not bear equally even on all those who do
qualify as OCSSPs. Art. 17(6) limits the liability of small startup platforms “which
have been available to the public in the Union for less than three years and which
have an annual turnover below EUR 10 million” to “best efforts to obtain
authorization,” and failing that, a notice and takedown regime. Startups whose
“average number of monthly unique visitors . . . exceeds 5 million” also incur a staydown obligation.
Art. 17(5) introduces further flexibility by instructing member States to
ensure that OCSSPs’ duties are proportional to their size and resources. “Best efforts”
clauses temper OCSSPs’ obligations to block unauthorized content and, upon proper
notice, to ensure that the content cannot be re-uploaded. The Directive recognizes
that the results of the “best efforts” of smaller platforms might be less effective than
the more costly “best efforts” of the principal commercial actors.
C. Exceptions and User Redress Mechanisms
Art. 17(7) requires member States to ensure that users may continue to upload
content covered by copyright exceptions and limitations, particularly for quotation,
criticism, review, caricature, parody or pastiche. To that end, Recital 70 explains, “It
is important to ensure that online content-sharing service providers operate an
effective complaint and redress mechanism to support use for such specific
64

We can further infer the exclusion of search engines from the rejection of the following amendment
added by the EU Parliament as art. 13b: “Member States shall ensure that information society service
providers that automatically reproduce or refer to significant amounts of copyright-protected visual
works and make them available to the public for the purpose of indexing and referencing conclude fair
and balanced licensing agreements with any requesting rightholders in order to ensure their fair
remuneration. Such remuneration may be managed by the collective management organisation of the
rightholders concerned.” The amendment clearly targeted Google Image Search, but ultimately did
not carry the day.
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purposes.” Art. 17(9) details the mechanism for expeditious redress. First, OCSSPs’
terms and conditions must inform users that they can avail themselves of copyright
exceptions, and the OCSSPs must “put in place” (and implicitly, inform users of) an
“effective and expeditious complaint and review mechanism” so that users may
challenge the blocking or disabling of their postings. Second, rightholders must “duly
justify” their takedown notices. User complaints then must be “processed without
undue delay” by the OCSSP, who must engage in human review of the challenged
postings. Art. 17(9) also requires member States to provide both access to courts and
to alternate dispute resolution measures so that users may assert their entitlement to
copyright exceptions (presumably in the event that the OCSSP maintains the
takedown over the user’s objection). Finally, art. 17(10) calls for “stakeholder
dialogues” to discuss the “best practices” required by art. 17(4) as well as to
implement exceptions and limitations.

III.

Comparing DSM Directive art. 17 to sec. 512 of the US Copyright Act

With respect to the service providers it regulates (a much smaller, but
economically very significant, subset of the service providers covered by sec. 512),
the DSM Directive establishes a regime that is effectively the opposite of sec. 512’s
liability limitation approach. Where sec. 512 absolves service providers who meet
the statutory “safe harbor” criteria from obtaining authorization, so long as they
“respond expeditiously” to takedown notices, the DSM Directive requires that
OCSSPs acquire rights from copyright owners up front. Where sec. 512 imposes no
ex ante proactive duties to block infringing content, the DSM Directive obliges
OCSSPs and rightholders to cooperate in preventing unauthorized content from being
posted in the first place. And where US courts do not uniformly enter “stay down”
remedies,65 the DSM Directive makes them mandatory for OCSSPs other than
economically modest startups.
Both section 512 and art. 17 provide mechanisms to challenge the removal of
postings that users believe to be non-infringing, but sec. 512(g) places a higher
burden of justification on rightholders: if a user sends a counter notification, the
rightholder, in order to maintain the content’s removal, must initiate a copyright
infringement suit against the user, otherwise the service will repost the content.
Section 512(f), moreover, provides for courts to award users damages and attorneys’
fees against a rightholder “who knowingly materially misrepresents that material or
activity is infringing.” Section 512 thus offers two kinds of user redress: automatic
65

The Copyright Office has expressed some skepticism about a notice-and-staydown regime, see
REGISTER’S SECTION 512 REPORT, supra note 13 at 191 (“There are reasons to be cautious regarding
the adoption of a general staydown requirement for OSPs. . . . [A]doption of a staydown requirement,
with or without an affirmative filtering requirement for all (or even most) OSPs, would represent a
fundamental shift of intermediary liability policy in the United States.”).
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reposting if the rightholder fails to initiate an infringement action following receipt
of a counter notification, and the prospect of substantial monetary liability if the
rightholder abuses the notice and takedown process.66
In this regard, the role of human review plays out differently in the US and in
the EU. Ninth Circuit precedent suggests that to avoid claims of misrepresentation,
the rightholder may need to engage in human review of the alleged infringing
postings before sending a takedown notice, while art. 17(9) directs the service
provider to engage in human review in response to the user’s complaint that the
OCSSP erroneously blocked her posting. But, under the DSM Directive, if the
OCSSP rejects the user’s challenge, it appears that the user who seeks the reposting
of the content will incur the burden of seeking judicial, or alternate dispute resolution,
relief. On the other hand, the participation of user representatives in the “stakeholder
dialogs” to articulate criteria for ex ante blocking, and the direction to ensure the
availability of mandatory exceptions, may effectively reinforce user access to noninfringing content by avoiding its blockage in the first place.
Section 512’s effective codification of “seek forgiveness, not permission” has
fostered a vast amount of communication among internet users, but also shifted a vast
amount of wealth to large commercial actors, without commensurate benefits to the
creators of works. The US Congress is now reviewing many aspects of the 1976
Copyright Act, including the section 512 safe harbor regime. If Congress wishes to
revise section 512 by returning the default from liability limitation to the normal
copyright approach of obtaining authorization, the DSM Directive offers Congress a
model, or at least a detailed example of reform. The development of identification
tools such as Content-ID has belied at least some of the technological assumptions
that underlay the 1998 legislation. Moreover, section 512’s notice-and-takedown
regime is not cost-free to either the copyright owner or the service provider,
especially given the immense volume of notices.67 Content-ID and equivalent white
list/black list systems already implement by private agreement much of the DSM
Directive’s regime of cooperation in content licensing and blocking. But where these
private enforcement measures may not be readily or equally available to all copyright
owners, particularly not to individual authors and small rightholders, the EU
approach should enable more authors and rightholders to obtain the benefits of
66

On the other hand, courts have applied a rather forgiving standard of bad behavior in determining
whether a takedown notice constituted a “knowing […] material […] misrepresentation.” See Rossi
v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.2004), discussed supra.
67
Cary Sherman, Valuing Music in a Digital World, Forbes (Sept. 23, 2015) (RIAA CEO saying that
notice and takedown regime is "a never-ending game that is both costly and increasingly pointless.");
How
Google
Fights
Piracy,
p.
30
(November
2018),
https://www.blog.google/documents/25/GO806_Google_FightsPiracy_eReader_final.pdf (noting in
2017 YouTube received 2.5 million takedown request for more than 7 million videos, indicating that
it “carefully reviewed” the requests and asked for more information or rejected requests related to
300,000 videos).
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licensing and ex ante blocking.68 Finally, it will be important to assess which
mechanisms, the measures established in section 512(f)(g), or those in art. 17(7)(9)
and (10), prove in practice most likely to preserve copyright exceptions in the
content-sharing environment.

68

For detailed analysis of how this might be achieved within the DSM Directive art. 17 framework,
see Matthias Leistner, European Copyright Licensing and Infringement Liability Under Art. 17 DSM
Directive Compared to Secondary Liability of Content Platforms in the U.S. – Can We Make the New
European System a Global Opportunity Instead of a Local Challenge?, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GEISTIGES
E IGENTUM/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL (forthcoming 2020).
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